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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-2500 
 
___________ 
 
SAMEECH RAWLS, 
 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
GIBBS, Kitchen Staff Member, SCI Greene; MICHAEL GUYTON, Unit Manager, SCI 
Greene; ROBERT GILMORE, Facility Manager, SCI Greene; MR. CUMBERLEDGE, 
Safety Manager, SCI Greene; CAPTAIN DURCO, Security, SCI Greene 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(W.D. Pa. Civil Action No. 2-16-cv-01438) 
Magistrate Judge: Honorable Lisa P. Lenihan 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 9, 2018 
 
Before:  GREENAWAY, JR., BIBAS and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: November 1, 2018) 
 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Pro se appellant Sameech Rawls appeals the District Court’s dismissal of his 
complaint for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).  For 
the reasons that follow, we will vacate the District Court’s judgment and remand the case 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 In November 2016, Rawls filed a pro se complaint raising claims pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986.  Rawls is incarcerated at the State Correctional 
Institution at Greene; he claims that five institutional defendants violated his 
constitutional rights in various ways during his incarceration.  Defendants moved to 
dismiss his complaint on February 23, 2017.  The District Court set a briefing schedule 
the following day, giving Rawls an opportunity to respond to the motion or file an 
amended complaint by March 17.  When Rawls did not respond, the District Court set a 
new deadline of June 23, 2017.  It warned Rawls that if he did not respond to the District 
Court’s order, his case would be dismissed for failure to prosecute.  It did not specify 
whether the dismissal would be with or without prejudice.  Rawls did not submit a 
response or an amended complaint by the deadline. 
 On June 29, 2017, the District Court entered an order dismissing Rawls’ complaint 
with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).  Rawls timely appealed 
and both he and appellees have submitted briefs for our review. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review 
the District Court’s dismissal of Rawls’ complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
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Procedure 41(b) for an abuse of discretion.  Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 257 (3d Cir. 
2008). 
 A district court may dismiss an action sua sponte if a litigant fails to comply with a 
court order or prosecute his or her case.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see Donnelly v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 677 F.2d 339, 341 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that Rule 41(b) 
authorizes “sua sponte dismissals by [a] court . . . on the same basis as it authorizes 
dismissals upon motion of [a] defendant”).  Before a court does so, it must consider the 
following six factors: 
(1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the 
adversary[;] . . . 3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the 
party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of 
sanctions other than dismissal[;] . . . and (6) the meritoriousness of the 
claim or defense. 
 
Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984); see also United 
States v. $8,221,877.16 in U.S. Currency, 330 F.3d 141, 161 (3d Cir. 2003) (“We have 
opined that [the Poulis] factors must be weighed by a district court in determining 
whether the harsh sanction of dismissal is justified.”). 
“Dismissal must be a sanction of last, not first, resort.”  Poulis, 747 F.2d at 869.  
“While we defer to the discretion of the district court, we are mindful that dismissal with 
prejudice is only appropriate in limited circumstances” and “requires that we carefully 
review each such case to ascertain whether the district court abused its discretion in 
applying such an extreme sanction . . . and in this review doubts should be resolved in 
favor of reaching a decision on the merits.”  Adams v. Trustees of N.J. Brewery Emp.’s 
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Pension Tr. Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 870 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  In the rare case where a party has willfully engaged in “contumacious” 
conduct, courts may dismiss a case without first analyzing the Poulis factors.  See Guyer 
v. Beard, 907 F.2d 1424, 1429-30 (3d Cir. 1990).   
In this case, the District Court did not address the Poulis factors in its dismissal of 
Rawls’ case with prejudice.  It did not describe any willful action by Rawls that 
constituted sufficiently “contumacious” conduct to warrant that sanction.  See Ali v. 
Sims, 788 F.2d 954, 958 (3d Cir. 1986) (concluding that a “lone remark that defendants 
had ‘brazenly ignored’ the court’s [earlier] order is insufficient to justify” a sua sponte 
issue-dispositive sanction); cf. Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 455 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(dismissal without consideration of the Poulis factors was not an abuse of discretion 
where a plaintiff “willfully refused to prosecute her remaining claims after receiving an 
adverse ruling by the district court” as it was “difficult to conceive of what other course 
the court could have followed”); Guyer, 907 F.2d at 1430 (dismissal without 
consideration of the Poulis factors was appropriate where a plaintiff repeatedly and 
actively indicated “that he had no intention of signing a . . . form in order to communicate 
with the court pending the adjudication of his claims,” making “adjudication of the case 
impossible”).  The Court also did not consider whether any lesser sanction would have 
“furthered the interests of justice.”  See Guyer, 907 F.2d at 1430. 
Accordingly, the District Court abused its discretion in dismissing Rawls’ case 
with prejudice.  Thus, we will vacate the District Court’s June 29, 2017 order and remand 
5 
 
the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.1 
                                              
1  Although appellees ask us to conduct our own analysis of the Poulis factors, we decline 
to do so as it “would require factual findings not within the parameters of our review.”  
Livera v. First Nat. State Bank of N.J., 879 F.2d 1186, 1194 (3d Cir. 1989).  We note, for 
example, that there is nothing in the record before us to support appellees’ contention that 
Rawls’ non-responsiveness constituted “willful and deliberate defiance” of the District 
Court’s orders.  See Appellees’ Br. at ECF p. 16.  Rawls represents that he is mentally 
impaired, relies on assistance to submit his filings, and has been unable to access his legal 
paperwork while he has been in disciplinary segregation.  See Appellant’s Br. at ECF 
p. 4.  If, on remand, the District Court again considers dismissal under Rule 41(b), it 
“should balance all six of the relevant factors.”  United States v. $8,221,877.16 in U.S. 
Currency, 330 F.3d 141, 162 (3d Cir. 2003).  “[I]t is imperative that the District Court 
have a full understanding of the surrounding facts and circumstances pertinent to the 
Poulis factors before it undertakes [an] analysis.”  Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 258 
(3d Cir. 2008). 
